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Abstract
Under conditions of informational asymmetry, redistributing the property
rights may improve work incentives but lead to an inefficient choice of en-
trepreneurial risk. We present a model in which reassignment of property
rights does not affect factor prices and we show that there exist egalitarian
asset redistributions that enhance allocative efficiency. The scope for such
redistributions can be broadened by offering fair insurance protecting the in-
dependent entrepreneur against risk unassociated with the production process
and against production uncertainties that are unrelated to the quality of their
individual decisions. The market will generally supply insurance of this type
suboptimally.
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bowles@econs.umass.edu. We would like to thank Arjun Jayadev and participants at the NBER
Summer Institute for comments, and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support.
1
1 Introduction
Redistributing economic resources in favor of the nonwealthy often entail consid-
erable allocative inefficiencies by distorting incentives facing economic decision
makers. One often proposed, potentially efficiency-enhancing, form of redistribu-
tion is to turn employees into owners and entrepreneurs, thereby improving work
incentives while at the same time reducing wealth inequality.1 A weighty impedi-
ment to such policies is that nonwealthy entrepreneurs tend to be more risk averse
than wealthy and/or highly diversified owners—for instance stockholders.2 As a
consequence, there is generally a tradeoff between effective work incentives and so-
cially optimal risk choices.3 We explore ways of attenuating this tradeoff, extending
an approach suggested by Domar and Musgrave (1944) and Sinn (1995).
A number of empirical investigations document a high level of risk aversion
on the part of the nonwealthy. Low wealth entails lower return to independent
agricultural production, for instance, because farmers sacrifice expected returns for
more secure returns. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find that low-wealth Indian
farmers seeking a means to secure more stable consumption streams, hold bullocks,
1See Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000) and the works cited there, especially Laffont and Matoussi
(1995), Legros and Newman (1996), Banerjee and Ghatak (1996), Mookherjee (1997) and Hoff
(1996b).
2See Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994) and the many studies cite therein.
3We assume in this paper that the socially optimal risk level for a project is that which maximizes
expected return; i.e., society is risk neutral. The Capital Assets Pricing Model asserts that this is true
only if ‘market risk’ affecting the entire economy is zero. To simplify our analysis, we assume that
this is the case.
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which are a highly liquid form of capital, instead of buying pumps, which are illiquid
but have high expected return. The relevant effects are not small. Rosenzweig and
Binswanger (1993) find, for example, that a one standard deviation reduction in
weather risk would raise average profits by about a third among farmers in the lowest
wealth quartile (p. 75), and virtually not at all for the top wealth-holders. Moreover,
they conclude that the demand for weather insurance would come primarily, if not
exclusively, from poor farmers. Nerlove and Soedjiana (1996) find a similar effect
in Indonesia with respect to sheep.4
Thus because of risk aversion, a reassignment of property rights to low-wealth
entrepreneurs might be unsustainable if as a result entrepreneurs’income streams are
subject to high levels of stochastic variation. Carter, Barham and Mesbah (1996)
and Jarvis (1989) provide a vivid example: in the Central Valley of Chile three
quarters of those families who received individual assignment of land rights under
a land redistribution program in the 1970’s sold their assets within a decade.
However, as Musgrave, Domar, and Sinn suggest, the availability of insurance
can lead to increased risk-taking and willingness to hold risky assets.5 But the
market for forms of insurance that promote entrepreneurial risk-taking may be im-
perfect (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). Shiller (1993) provides several contemporary
applications, arguing that capital market imperfections even in the most advanced
4See Hoff (1996a) for a discussion of this and related studies.
5More recently, Black and de Meza (1997) argue that public insurance may improve efficiency
when there heterogeneous occupational risk, but their model works through price changes rather than
wealth changes. For more on mixed public/private insurance, see Blomqvist and Johansson (1997)
and Selden (1997).
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economies lead to the absence of insurance markets for major sources of individual
insecurity and inequality. For instance, a major form of wealth insecurity in many
families is the capital value of the family home, due to medium- to long-term fluc-
tuations in average housing prices in a region. No insurance for such fluctuations
is available, but Shiller suggests that this and other similar insurance markets can
be activated through proper financial interventions. Along these same lines, Sinn
(1995) argues that the welfare state in the advanced economies can be understood
in part as a successful set of policy measures to improve the risk-taking behavior of
the nonwealthy where private ‘social insurance’ markets fail.
On the other hand, many attempts at preserving the small independent en-
trepreneur through extending credit availability and crop insurance have failed
(Carter and Coles 1997), though these failures may be due to forms of insurance
that are not incentive compatible (Newbery 1989). For instance, insuring individual
crops reintroduces the same agency problems as sharecropping and wage labor. By
contrast, as we show below, allowing entrepreneurs to purchase insurance covering
some general condition that is correlated with individual crop risk but that does not
affect individual production incentives, can be effective in eliciting risk taking on
the part of the nonwealthy without incurring efficiency losses. A crop insurance
program in India, for example, based payments to individual farmers not on the
output of their own plots but rather on average crop yields in larger agro-climatic
regions to which they belong (Dandekar 1985). Disaster insurance for crops in
the United States is similarly designed (Williams, Carriker, Barnaby and Harper
1993). Or insurance payments may be based on the exogenous source of the risk
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itself, if this is measurable. An example of this is rainfall insurance, whereby the
entrepreneur pays a fixed premium, and receives a schedule of returns depending
upon the average rainfall in the region over the growing season.6
In this spirit, we show below that under plausible conditions reducing the ex-
posure of the nonwealthy to stochastic fluctuations independent of their productive
activities can induce increased entrepreneurial risk-taking, and hence can help sus-
tain otherwise unsustainable asset redistributions. General social insurance can
also allow access to credit markets for wealth-poor agents who would be otherwise
excluded. Platteau, Murickan, Palatty and Delbar (1980), Sanderatne (1986), Ard-
ington and Lund (1995) and Deaton and Case (1998) provide some evidence for
this phenomenon.
In our analysis we shall use a ‘productivity enhancing’ criterion in place of
the more familiar ‘Pareto improving’ criterion because we are studying policies
aimed at egalitarian redistribution, to which the Pareto improving criterion need
not apply. Nor need the usual ‘compensation criteria’ apply. According to the
compensation criteria, gainers from the policy must be able to compensate losers,
but potential losers must not be able to compensate potential gainers to forego the
policy. However if redistribution is the goal, there is no reason to require that
compensations be feasible.
6Similarly, the taxation of agricultural income can be based on general growing conditions rather
than measured farm output, thus combining insurance and revenue-producing goals. The idea is not
new. The Zabt system of taxation, developed by the Mughal rulers of North India during the Sixteenth
Century, based assessments on estimates of the productive capacities of the land rather than on actual
harvests (Richards 1993):85ff.
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This accounts for our definition of a policy as productivity enhancing if the gain-
ers could compensate the losers and still remain better off, except that the implied
compensation need not be implementable under the informational conditions and
incentive constraints of the economy. A productivity enhancing egalitarian asset
redistribution refers to a mandated reassignment to wealth-poor suppliers of labor
services of residual claimancy and control over assets, which would not take place
through competitive exchange but which is sustainable as a competitive equilibrium
following the redistribution. The productivity gains associated with this class of
redistributions arise from improvements in technical efficiency made possible by
the improved incentives supported by reallocation of residual claimancy rights. As
we will see, the efficient assignment of residual claimancy rights does not arise
through private exchange because, while ex post assignment of rights to the poor
is constrained Pareto efficient and hence sustainable in a competitive equilibrium,
the ex ante distribution of rights is also constrained Pareto efficient, so given the ex
ante distribution, private exchanges will not implement the ex post distribution of
rights.
The model developed below shows that, exposed to the risk associated with
residual claimancy, asset-poor entrepreneurs
(a) may avoid buying projects that they could operate productively, even when they
are financially capable of doing so, may sell rather than operate such projects
that are transferred to them, and will choose suboptimal levels of risk for any
project that they do retain and operate;
(b) there exists a class of productivity enhancing egalitarian asset redistributions
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that are sustainable as competitive equilibria but will not occur through private
contracting even when loans are available to all entrepreneurs at the risk-free
interest rate;
(c) this class may be expanded by a offering fair insurance to nonwealthy asset
holders that protects the entrepreneur against risk unassociated with the pro-
duction process (e.g., health insurance, consumer goods price stabilization) or
that protects independent entrepreneurs against ‘industry risk’ that is unrelated
to the quality of their own decisions;
(d) while competitive profit maximizing insurers may supply some forms of in-
surance of this type, they will generally do so in a suboptimal manner.
Our approach relates to the literature on wealth, risk-taking, and insurance as
follows. Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Banerjee and Newman (1991) develop
models in which more risk averse agents become employees and less risk averse
agents become entrepreners. They also showed that this situation involves alloca-
tional inefficiencies occasioned by incomplete markets for risk-sharing. Our model
adds that with declining risk-aversion the nonwealthy will be employees and the
wealthy entrepreneurs. In a related paper, Kanbur (1979) showed that when gen-
eral equilibrium effects are included, redistributive taxation need not reduce the
economic inequality occasioned by heterogeneous levels of risk aversion. In our
model, egalitarian policies do not affect prices or the wage rate, and we take the
profit rate as exogenous, as in the case of a small country operating without capital
controls in an international economic system. Therefore Kanbur’s results do not
obtain in our model. Two papers prior to the present contribution (Banerjee and
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Newman 1993, Aghion and Bolton 1997) have modeled the dependence of the oc-
cupational distribution on the wealth distribution. Both assume risk-neutral agents
and imperfect credit markets and, like us, find that redistribution can both improve
productive efficiency and reduce wealth inequality. Our contribution in this regard
is thus to extend their results to the case of risk-averse agents.
2 The Model
Consider a risk neutral employer who owns an asset and employs a worker. The
worker receives a wage w, and the project uses non-depreciable capital goods with
value k. We assume the employer must supervise the worker to guarantee perfor-
mance, with supervision costs m > 0. We also assume the project consists of a
continuum of possible technologies of varying risk and expected return, with higher
risk yielding higher expected return over some range. We summarize the choice of
technology in an expected net revenue schedule g(σ ), which is a concave function
of the standard deviation of revenue σ > 0, with a maximum at some σ ∗ > 0.7
We then write the employer’s profits, net of the opportunity costs of capital,
p(σ) as
p(σ) = σz+ g(σ )− ρk −m− w (1)
7This shape follows from two plausible assumptions. First, production techniques that offer
positive expected return involve a strictly positive level of risk. Hence expected return is an increasing
function of risk for low levels of risk. Second, firms have access to production techniques that have
very high returns when successful, but with a low probability of success (e.g. a firm may lower costs
by not diversifying its product line, or by assuming the availability of particular production inputs).
Hence above a certain point expected return declines with increasing risk.
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where z is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation unity and ρ is
the risk-free interest rate.
The employer, who is risk neutral, maximizes Ep(σ), the expected value of
profits, giving first order condition
(Ep)σ = g′(σ ) = 0, (2)
determining the expected profit-maximizing risk level σ ∗.8 We further assume that
the project is part of a competitive system with free entry, so profits must be zero in
equilibrium. Since the employer is risk-neutral, this means the equilibrium wage
rate w∗ is given by
w∗ = g(σ ∗)− ρk −m. (3)
Suppose the wage-earner considers becoming an independent entrepreneur by
renting capital and undertaking production. To abstract from problems of credit
availability, we assume that the productive equipment constituting the asset may
be rented at a per-period cost ρk where ρ is the risk-free interest rate. This is
equivalent to assuming that the entrepreneur can borrow funds to purchase the asset
at the risk-free rate. The independent entrepreneur’s net payoff is then given by
y(σ ) = σz+ g(σ )− ρk, (4)
since being self-employed, the entrepreneur pays neither the wage nor the moni-
8Here and throughout the paper, we use a variable subscript to a function to denote the partial
derivative with respect to this variable.
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toring cost (we assume that the effort level of the entrepreneur remains the same).
Indeed, the fact that the entrepreneur does not incur the monitoring cost captures
our assumption that productive efficiency improves when the entrepreneur ceases
being a wage-earner and becomes the residual claimant.
Suppose the supplier of labor services has utility function u(w), which is twice
differentiable, increasing, and concave in wealth w, and define
v(σ, µ) = Eu(w) =
∫ ∞
−∞
u(µ+ σz)dF (z), (5)
where F(z) is the cumulative distribution of z. Thus v(σ, µ) is the expected utility
of the payoff µ + σz. We write the slope of the level curves v(σ, µ) = v¯ where
v¯ ∈ R.
s(σ, µ) = −vσ
vµ
, (6)
and we write the Arrow-Pratt risk coefficient for the agent as
λ(w) = −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
.
We then have the following, due to Meyer (1987) and Sinn (1990):
Proposition 1. Suppose v(σ, µ) is defined by 5 and s(σ, µ) is defined by (6). Then
(i) For σ > 0, vµ(σ, µ) > 0 and vσ (σ, µ) < 0.
(ii) s(0, µ) = 0.
(iii) s(σ, µ) > 0 when σ > 0;
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(iv) v(σ, µ) is concave;
(v) sµ(σ, µ) < 0 when λ′(w) < 0;
(vi) sσ (σ, µ) > 0.
This Proposition shows that v(σ, µ) behaves like a utility function where µ is a
‘good’ and σ is a ‘bad.’ The level curves v(σ, µ) = v¯ are then indifference curves
which, in the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion, are increasing, convex, flat
at σ = 0, become flatter for increasing µ when σ > 0, and become steeper for
increasing σ . Movements to the north and to the west thus indicate both improved
welfare and flatter indifference curves. These properties are illustrated in Figure 1.
We henceforth assume the supplier of labor serices exhibits decreasing absolute risk
aversion, which means λ′(w) < 0; i.e., the agent becomes less risk averse as wealth
increases.9
µ
σ
Figure 1: Indifference Curves of the Decreasingly Absolutely Risk Averse Agent
with Utility Function v(σ, µ)
9Virtually all empirical studies support decreasing absolute risk aversion. For a recent review of
the literature, see Saha et al. (1994).
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The entrepreneur then chooses σ to maximize
π(σ) ≡ v(σ, µ(σ))
where
µ(σ) ≡ Ey(σ ) = g(σ )− ρk, (7)
giving the first order condition
πσ = vµ[g′(σ )− s(σ, µ(σ))] = 0. (8)
This indicates that the marginal rate of transformation of risk into expected payoffs,
g′(σ ), must equal the marginal rate of substitution between risk and expected payoff,
s(σ, µ). The entrepreneur’s optimizing problem as residual claimant is depicted in
Figure 2 as choosing the highest indifference curve of v(σ, µ) that satisfies the
constraint (7), which is just the tangency point at A, giving σo, which satisfies the
first order condition (8). The entrepreneur’s risk aversion implies s(σ, µ) > 0,
which by (8) requires that σo < σ ∗, so the independent entrepreneur chooses a
lower level of risk than the risk neutral employer.
The tradeoff between the allocative gains and suboptimal risk losses that occur
when the asset is assigned to the asset-poor entrepreneur is illustrated in Figure 2.
This figure depicts both the pre-transfer allocation in which the employer chooses
σ ∗ and pays w∗, and the post-asset-transfer situation indicated by point A. The
allocative gain associated with the transfer is the increase in the expected return
from w∗ to the point D, or just m, the saving in monitoring input. The suboptimal
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risk loss is D−F , reflecting the fact that the risk averse entrepreneur prefers point
A to point C on the risk-return schedule. There is no reason, of course, to expect
the gains to exceed the costs.
σ
µ
σ ∗
w∗

 
A

v = vk
v = vo
B
C
D
F
σo
µ(σ) = g(σ )− ρk
w(σ) = g(σ )− ρk −m
Figure 2: The Tradeoff between Gain in Expected Return and Lost in Suboptimal
Risk Taking
To compare the welfare of the supplier of labor services as entrepreneur as
opposed to wage-earner, note that when the employer chooses σ , by (3) the equi-
librium payoff to the employee occurs at the maximum point σ ∗ of the schedule
w = g(σ ) − ρk − m, as shown at point B in Figure 3(a). Figure 3(a) shows
the case where the agent is better off as entrepreneur rather than employee, since
the indifference curve through (σ o, µ(σ o)) is higher than the indifference curve
through (0, w∗). By contrast, Figure 3(b) shows the case where the agent is better
off working for the employer. Notice that in this case the agent has higher expected
income as residual claimant than as wage-earner, but is exposed to an excessive
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level of risk. The differences between the two cases is the greater degree of risk
aversion assumed in the second case, as is indicated by the steeper indifference
locus. Competitive equilibrium for the first case implies that the agent acquire the
asset and in the second that the agent work for the employer, so in both cases the
competitive assignment of residual claimancy and control rights would appear to
implement an efficient solution.

σ ∗
σ
w∗
µ

σo
µ(σ) = g(σ )− ρk

✻
❄
m

σ ∗
σ
w∗
µ

σo



 B
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Comparing Wage Earning and Independent Production
Note that in (a) the agent is better off as residual claimant, and in (b)
the reverse is true.
3 Wealth Redistribution
We now consider whether the analysis would be altered by an outright transfer of
k to the entrepreneur, thus obviating the need to rent these assets. It might well be
thought that the result would not change, as the agent’s per period return from selling
the asset ρk is exactly the rental cost, so the asset transfer simply converts a direct
cost (the cost of renting the capital) into an opportunity cost (the forgone cost of
renting the capital to another agent), seemingly leaving the analysis unaffected. But
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this inference is unwarranted. Suppose the entrepreneur has wealth w not associated
with entrepreneurship, and earns a secure income ρw on this wealth. Then we have
Theorem 1. If the entrepreneur satisfies decreasing absolute risk aversion, the level
of risk the entrepreneur assumes is an increasing function of wealth w.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Increasing the entrepreneur’s
wealth flattens the indifference curves in σ -µ space, so the optimal production point
moves closer to the maximum on the risk-return schedule. To prove the theorem,
note that with wealth w, (7) now becomes
µ(σ) = ρ(w − k)+ g(σ ),
and the entrepreneur as before chooses σ to maximize π(σ) ≡ v(σ, µ(σ)), giving
the first order condition (8), which we totally differentiate with respect to w to obtain
πσσ
dσ
dw
+ πσw = 0.
Now πσσ < 0 by the second order condition, and
πσw = −ρvµsµ > 0,
since sµ(σw, µw) < 0 by Proposition 1v. Thus dσ/dw > 0.
It follows that there exist wealth transfers of the following form: before the
transfer, the agent prefers to work for an owner whose capital stock is k. When an
amount k of wealth is transferred to the agent, indifference curves become flatter,
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and in the new situation holding the productive asset and becoming an independent
entrepreneur is the preferred alternative. The transfer is productivity enhancing
because the increase in technical efficiency (elimination of m) is not offset by the
output losses occasioned by the suboptimal risk level.

σ ∗
σ
w∗
µ

σo
✻
❄
m


 B
A
Pre-Transfer
✲
Post-Transfer

C
D
IA
IB
wo
w1
Figure 4: Example of a Productivity Enhancing Asset Redistribution
This is illustrated in Figure 4. In this figure, the before-transfer indifference
curves for the agent are the dashed curves. Clearly wage labor dominates indepen-
dent production. After the transfer, indicated by the solid curves, the decrease in
risk aversion of the agent renders independent production superior to wage labor.10
Theorem 2. Starting from an competitive equilibrium with a given distribution of
wealth, there is somemmin such that form ≥ mmin, there is a productivity enhancing
10The utility levels corresponding to the dashed and the solid indifference curves are of course
not the same. particular, the dashed indifference curve through point (0, w∗) corresponds to a lower
utility level than the solid indifference curve through (0, w∗), since in the latter case the agent has
higher wealth.
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redistribution of wealth that can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium.
Proof: We know from Proposition 1v that s(µ, σ,w+k) < s(µ, σ,w), the transfer
of wealth k flattening the indifference curves. Suppose IA and IB are the before and
after redistribution indifference curves tangent to the independent entrepreneur’s
production frontier DABC (Figure 4), respectively. Let wo be the point where
IA intersects the µ-axis, and let w1 be the point where IB intersects the µ-axis, so
wo < w1. Then as long asm is such thatw∗ ∈ (wo,w1), the entrepreneur would not
have chosen to acquire the asset prior to the transfer yet prefers holding the asset to
selling it and working for the employer. Thus the transfer is sustainable. This result
also demonstrates that the gains to the entrepreneur are sufficient to compensate the
previous owner of the asset as the entrepreneur’s returns to holding the asset exceed
the opportunity cost ρk, which is identical to the required compensation.
An egalitarian wealth transfer may thus be productivity enhancing, although the
compensation that rendered the transaction a Pareto improvement is not generally
implementable, since a lump sum wealth transfer k to the former owner (or equiva-
lently, an enforceable commitment of the entrepreneur to pay ρk per period) would
simply induce the entrepreneur to sell rather than operate the asset.
Credit market constraints played no part in this demonstration, as the en-
trepreneur was assumed to be able to borrow at the competitive risk-free interest rate
ρ. However if the asset poor do face credit constraints insofar as a transfer of wealth
may alleviate these constraints a second class of productivity enhancing asset trans-
fers may exist. To see this assume that the cost of borrowing to the entrepreneur is
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r(w) where w ≥ 0 is the total collateralizable wealth of the entrepreneur, where
r ′(w) < 0 and lim
w→∞ r(w) = ρ. (9)
We have
Theorem 3. Suppose a credit constrained worker with wealth w faces an interest
rate r(w) satisfying (9), and a fraction κ of the value k of the capital requirements
of the project can serve as collateral on a loan. Then for sufficiently large k the
transfer of the capital good to the agent is productivity enhancing.
Proof: A entrepreneur with wealth w can acquire the capital good at per period
cost of r(w − (1 − κ)k)k. The expected income µp for the entrepreneur who
purchases the asset is
µp(σ) = g(σ )− r(w − (1 − κ)k)k,
while the expected income µt for the entrepreneur who has acquired the asset by
transfer is
µt(σ ) = g(σ )− r(w + κk)k.
Choose σ ∗p and σ ∗t to maximize v(σ, µp(σ )), and v(σ, µt(σ )), respectively. The
agent who is employed and receiving the wagew∗ would not benefit from purchasing
the asset if v(σ ∗p, µp(σ ∗p)) < v∗(0, w∗), which is clearly true for sufficiently large
k. The same agent having received the asset k by transfer would prefer to hold the
asset if v(µt(σ ∗t ), σ ∗t ) > v∗(0, w∗). A productivity enhancing asset transfer thus
18
σ ∗
σ
w∗
µ



g(σ )− ρk −m
g(σ)− r(w − (1 − κ)k)
g(σ )− r(w + κk)k
σ ∗p σ ∗t
(pre-transfer)
(post-transfer)
Figure 5: A Productivity Enhancing Redistribution where the Entrepreneur Faces
a Credit Constraint
requires that:
v(σ ∗p, µp(σ
∗
p)) < v
∗(0, w∗) < v(µt(σ ∗t ), σ ∗t ).
Suppose the first inequality is satisfied. Since
µt(σ )− µp(σ) = [r(w − (1 − κ)k)− r(w + κk)]k > 0,
it is clear that, for sufficiently large k, the second inequality will be satisfied as well
at σ = σ ∗p , and hence a fortiori at σ = σ ∗t .
Figure 5 illustrates a productivity enhancing redistribution to the credit con-
strained wealth poor entrepreneur.
Thus where a wealth transfer will alleviate the credit market constraints faced
by the wealth poor, productivity enhancing redistributions may exist even were
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the entrepreneurs’ risk aversion unaffected by the transfer. Hence wealth related
credit constraints and wealth related risk aversion provides the basis for productivity
enhancing asset redistributions. The two mechanisms are analogous in that in both
cases the transfer of the asset reduces the costs associated with the assignment of
residual claimancy and control rights to the wealth poor, attenuating suboptimal
risk taking and the costs of risk exposure in the first, and reducing the opportunity
cost of ownership in the second.
4 Insurance
It follows that measures that render the entrepreneur less risk averse, or lessen the
risk involved in production, lessen the risk allocation losses associated with the
reassignment of residual claimancy and control rights to low-wealth entrepreneurs.
An entrepreneur who acquires the productive asset through an egalitarian redistri-
bution policy, but who would otherwise prefer to sell this asset, could be induced by
such measures to remain residual claimant on the use of the asset. In addition, such
measures would reduce the losses from risk avoidance by entrepreneurs willingly
engaged in independent production. We shall suggest two plausible measures of
this type. The first involves insuring entrepreneurs against forms of risk exogenous
to the production process, and the second involves insuring entrepreneurs against
public risk—risk correlated with the risk of independent production, but which is
publicly observable.
Suppose the entrepreneur’s wealth independent from participating in produc-
tion, w, has a stochastic element γ ζ of mean zero distributed independently from z,
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where γ > 0 is a constant. We call such a stochastic element exogenous risk, and we
term a reduction in γ a reduction in exogenous risk (as opposed to the endogenous
risk σz that chosen by the entrepreneur).
It seems plausible that lowering exogenous risk would lead a entrepreneur to
increase endogenous risk, since we know from Proposition 1vi that the marginal
rate of substitution between risk and expected return, s(σ, µ), increases as the level
of risk increases. Therefore we would expect a reduction in the exogenous risk
faced by an independent entrepreneur to lower the ‘marginal cost’ of risk taking in
production, and hence increase voluntary risk-taking. In fact, however, we need a
condition stronger than decreasing absolute risk aversion to conclude that this is the
case. We have
Theorem 4. Let λ(w) = −u′′(w)/u′(w), the Arrow-Pratt risk coefficient at wealth
level w for an agent with utility function u(w) exhibiting decreasing absolute risk
aversion. Then if
λ′′(w) > λ(w)λ′(w), (10)
a reduction in exogenous risk leads the entrepreneur to increase the level of risk in
production.
Proof: We show in Lemma 1 in the Appendix that in the presence of exogenous
risk, we can still describe the entrepreneur as optimizing in σ -µ space, and the
indifference curves have the same properties when γ > 0, as when γ = 0. Then we
show in Proposition 2 in the Appendix that under the conditions stated in Theorem 4
that lowering γ flattens the entrepreneur’s indifference curves at each point in σ -ρ
space, and hence induces the entrepreneur to assume more risk.
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For what utility functions does Theorem 4’s condition 10 hold? Note that
for constant absolute risk aversion, which implies a utility function of the form
u(w) = α − βe−γw, exogenous risk does not affect the entrepreneur’s choice
of endogenous risk.11 We have not succeeded in finding a decreasing absolute
risk aversion utility function for which condition (10) is violated. Indeed, as the
next series of corollaries demonstrate, all decreasing absolute risk averse utility
functions that we have found in the research literature satisfy (10). We conclude
that Theorem 4 has quite general application.
The most obvious candidates are of course the logarithmic and power law utility
functions, which satisfy decreasing absolute and constant relative risk aversion
(meaning wλ(w) is constant). We have
Corollary 4.1. If the entrepreneur exhibits constant relative risk aversion, a reduc-
tion in exogenous risk γ ζ leads the entrepreneur to increase the level of risk σz in
production.
Proof: Constant relative risk aversion means that wλ(w) is constant, which implies
λ′(w) < 0 and λ′′(w) = −2λ′(w)/w > 0 > λ(w)λ′(w).
Another plausible candidate is a utility function whose Arrow-Pratt coefficient
declines according to a power law. We then have
Corollary 4.2. For any α, β > 0 there is an increasing, concave utility function
11To see this, note that with exponential utility, (20) in the Appendix shows that exogenous risk
merely multiplies the utility function by a constant.
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u(w) with Arrow-Pratt risk coefficient
λ(w) = αw−β.
If the entrepreneur has such a utility function, a reduction in exogenous risk γ ζ
leads the entrepreneur to increase the level of risk σz in production.
Proof: We can assume β = 1, since the β = 1 case follows from the previous
Corollary. To find u(w), we write the identity λ(w) = −u′′(w)/u′(w) in the form
d
dw
log u′(w) = −αw−β
and integrate twice, getting
u(w) =
∫
e
− α1−β w1−β dw.
By the Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, u(w) has the desired properties.12
We can then calculate directly that
λ′′(w)− λ(w)λ′(w) = αβw−2(1+β) (αw + (1 + β)wβ) > 0.
This completes the proof.
12This utility function has the closed form
u(w) = −)
[
1
1 − b ,
α
1 − bw
1−β
]
,
for β ∈ (0, 1), where ) is the incomplete Gamma function (Wolfram 1996).
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Finally, consider the following utility function:
u(w) = −e−αwβ , (11)
with β < 1, αβ > 0. This function and satisfies decreasing relative risk aversion
for α < 0, constant relative risk aversion for α = 0, and increasing relative risk
aversion for α > 0 (Saha et al. 1994). We have
Corollary 4.3. Suppose the entrepreneur has a utility function of the form (11) for
any β < 1 and any α such that the utility function is increasing in wealth. Then a
reduction in exogenous risk γ ζ leads the entrepreneur to increase the level of risk
σz in production.
Proof: A direct computation shows that utility is increasing in wealth if and only if
αβ > 0. Also,
λ′′(w)− λ(w)λ′(w) = 1 − β
w3
[
(3 − β)+ w2βα2β2 + 2αβwβ(2 − β)] ,
which is positive for all β < 1, αβ > 0.
Theorem 4 is illustrated in Figure 6 for the case where z + γ ζ form a linear
class (e.g., both z and ζ are normally or uniformly distributed). In the figure, the
reduction in exogenous risk leads the entrepreneur to increase endogenous risk from
point σa to σb.
We conclude that an economic policy measure that reduces the degree of un-
certainty facing entrepreneurs unrelated to the productive asset itself, for instance
health insurance, consumer goods price stabilization, or business cycle stabilization,
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µσ
µ(σ)


σa σb
v(σ, µ, γ+)

v(σ, µ, γ−)

Figure 6: Reducing Exogenous Risk Leads to Increased Production Risk.
Note: The dashed curve is the entrepreneur’s indifference curve under
conditions of reduced exogenous risk. The risk level is displaced from
σa to σb.
may induce nonwealthy entrepreneurs to assume a higher level of risk exposure in
production and thus increase the scope of application of productivity enhancing
egalitarian redistributions.
A second measure with similar properties is insurance against public risk. Sup-
pose the random variable η is positively correlated with the stochastic element z in
production, and is publicly observable at the end of the production period, hence
is contractible. We call η a production-related public risk. Average rainfall in the
region over the growing season, for instance, is a form of production-related public
risk. Consider a market for a fair insurance policy on production-related public risk
that pays entrepreneurs a premium l and obliges the entrepreneur to pay back an
amount bη at the end of the production period. We call this a public risk insurance
policy, and we call b the payback rate. We say the market in public risk insurance is
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competitive if the buyer is free to choose the premium and the payback rate, subject
to the insurance being fair. We have
Theorem 5. Suppose σ is not contractible, but there is a production-related public
risk variable η. Consider insurance in which the entrepreneur receives a lump sum
l∗ and pays the insurer b∗η when η is observed at the end of the period, and b∗ is
chosen so that the insurance is fair (i.e., l∗ = b∗Eη). Then
(a) (l, b) can be chosen so that a profit-maximizing entrepreneur will purchase the
policy and will choose the optimal risk level σ ∗.
(b) if (l, b) is chosen to maximize the entrepreneur’s payoff, subject to being fair,
the resulting level of entrepreneurial risk is socially optimal if and only if η is
perfectly correlated with z.
The intuition underlying Theorem 5 is that the socially optimal insurance policy
(l∗, b∗) induces risk neutral behavior by restricting the entrepreneur’s choice to
no insurance at all or more insurance than the entrepreneur would choose in a
competitive environment. Profit maximizing entrepreneurs would demand a lower
level of insurance. The reason for the difference is that only when the degree of
risk and the public signal are perfectly correlated does the insurance policy that
renders the standard deviation of income invariant to the choice of risk level by
the entrepreneur (inducing risk neutral behavior by the entrepreneur) also minimize
the standard deviation of income (corresponding to the entrepreneur’s desired fair
insurance policy).
Proof: Since the insurance is fair, l = bµη, whereµη = Eη. The entrepreneur’s
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payoff net of the opportunity cost of capital is then
y(σ, b) = ρ(w − k)+ σz+ g(σ )− b(η − µη) (12)
which is a random variable with mean
µ(σ) = ρ(w − k)+ g(σ )
and standard deviation τ given by
τ 2 = σ 2 − 2bσrzηση + b2σ 2η , (13)
where rzη is the correlation between z and η and ση is the standard deviation of η.
If the insurer chooses b, the entrepreneur’s first order condition (8) now becomes
u˜σ = vµ[µσ − s(µ, τ)τσ ] = 0, or
u˜σ = vµ
[
g′(σ )− s(µ, τ)σ − brzηση
τ
]
= 0. (14)
Since the Pareto-efficient level σ ∗ satisfies g′(σ ∗) = 0, the entrepreneur will be
induced to choose this level when
b∗ = σ
∗
rzηση
. (15)
The payout rate b∗ is that which renders the standard deviation of income invariant
with respect to the choice of risk and thus induces the entrepreneur to choose σ to
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maximize expected income. The corresponding premium is then l∗ = b∗µη.
Thus there is a fair public insurance policy that induces the socially optimal level
of risk-taking. Will such a policy be offered on a competitive insurance market?
Suppose the insurance market is competitive, so the entrepreneur can choose the
payback rate to maximize expected payoff. The entrepreneur then chooses σ and b
to maximize
u˜(σ, b) = E[u(y(σ, b))].
Because varying b does not affect the expected net cost of the insurance (since
l = bµη), reductions in the standard deviation of income are costless and the
optimal choice bo is that which minimizes τ 2, giving the first order condition
∂(τ 2)
∂b
= 2bσ 2η − 2rzησση = 0, (16)
From this we get
bo = σrzη
ση
. (17)
Substituting bo in (13) gives
τ = σ
√
1 − r2zη.
The optimal risk level σ then follows from the first order condition (14), which
becomes
g′(σ o) = s(µ(σ o), τ (σ o))
√
1 − r2zη. (18)
This is satisfied by γ ′(σ ) = 0 only when rzη = 1. Further, comparing (15) and (17)
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for rzη < 1, the payback rate that implements the socially optimal risk level b∗ will
exceed that which would be offered on a competitive insurance market.
There are three reasons why the market in public risk insurance may fail. First,
as we have seen in Theorem 5, the competitively determined insurance rate does not
achieve the socially optimal outcome. Second, the market in public risk insurance
is subject to adverse selection if rzη differs among entrepreneurs and is not public
knowledge. Third, a private industry selling public risk insurance may not be able
to operate as approximately risk neutral, since the signal η is a macroeconomic
variable that is perfectly correlated for all insurance purchasers, so insurance com-
panies cannot use the law of large numbers to handle the volatility of their payouts.
Moreover, if there is uncertainty concerning µη, or if µη shifts over time, the in-
surance companies’ risk position becomes even more precarious. Thus government
policy might be needed to implement this outcome.
Of course an analysis of the defects of the market solution to the independent
entrepreneur’s risk problem must be complemented by an analysis of the defects
of the public sector as an insurance provider. In particular, in the absence of a
mechanism guaranteeing their accountability, public decision-makers will choose
the level and type of independent entrepreneur insurance to meet multiple objectives,
of which fostering socially efficient production is only one.
5 Conclusion
The efficiency-equality trade off has conventionally been thought to arise from the
distorting disincentive effects of taxes and transfers on the motivation to engage in
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hard work, risk-taking and other productivity-enhancing behaviors. A more con-
temporary consideration of efficiency-equality relationships adds that when some
agents are asset poor and hence cannot be assigned residual claimancy status with
respect to their own actions, incentive distortions may arise not from governmental
interventions alone, but additionally from the incomplete nature of contracts govern-
ing risk-taking and effort combined with limited wealth holding by entrepreneurs.
In this setting redistribution of assets to the wealth poor may allow residual
claimancy to be assigned to those performing services that are not easily con-
tractible, thus attenuating the associated incentive problems, and possibly inducing
an efficiency-equality complementarity rather than tradeoff. Specifically, we have
shown that even if the poor face no credit market constraints, when the level of risk
aversion depends on the asset position of the individual, there may exist a multiplic-
ity of equilibrium assignments of residual claimancy and control rights associated
with wealth ownership. Analogous results hold for cases where risk aversion is
independent of wealth but in which the cost of capital to entrepreneurs depends on
their wealth level. Some of these multiple distributions of wealth may be both more
equal and more efficient (in a well defined sense) than others.13
However, as we have seen, this way of representing equality-efficiency relation-
ships also suggests possible allocational inefficiencies arising from the suboptimal
risk taking likely to be implemented by the asset poor. We have shown that insurance
against exogenous and public risk may broaden the scope for productivity enhanc-
13As in the work of Galor and Zeira (1993), Durlauf (1996) and subsequent contributions, our
model thus demonstrates the non-ergodic nature of the wealth distribution.
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ing egalitarian asset redistribution but that socially optimal levels of insurance will
not be offered by private providers. Thus a governmental intervention combining
asset redistribution and insurance may be warranted under some conditions.
6 Appendix
Suppose a entrepreneur has wealth w and income
y(σ ) = ρw + γ ζ + σz+ g(σ ), (19)
where ζ is a random variable with mean zero, positive variance, and cumulative
distribution G(ζ), γ > 0, and the remaining terms are defined as above. Then if
γ = 0, the random variables {y(σ )|σ > 0} form a linear class:
Definition. A family F = {yα} of random variables with finite means {µα} and
standard deviations {σα} is said to belong to a linear class if there is a random
variable z such that
yα − µα
σα
= z
for all α. We call the random variable z the generator F .
Lemma 1. Suppose u(·) is twice differentiable, increasing, and concave, and let
uˆ(w, γ ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
u(w + γ ζ )dG(ζ ), (20)
where ζ is a random variable with mean zero, finite variance, and cumulative
distribution G(ζ). Then Proposition 1 holds for uˆ(w, γ ), where γ is a parameter.
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Proof: We show that uˆ(w, γ ) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1, where w
is the argument to the utility function and γ is a parameter. Let us write, for any
function f ,
Eζ f =
∫ ∞
−∞
f (w + γ ζ )dG(ζ )
so uˆ(w, γ ) = Eζ u. Then using the same notation, we have uˆw(w, γ ) = Eζ uw > 0
and uˆww(w, γ ) = Eζ uww < 0, so uˆ(·, γ ) is twice differentiable, increasing, and
concave.
Remark. Lemma 1 shows that even when there is a stochastic element γ ζ in the
non-production-related income of the agent, Proposition 1 continues to hold. In this
case we write the utility function as u(w, γ ) and the mean-variance utility function
as v(σ, µ, γ ), with indifference curve slopes s(σ, µ, γ ). It remains to determine
the behavior of sγ (σ, µ, γ ). For this we will use
Lemma 2. Suppose g(x) and r(x) are defined on a (possibly infinite) interval (a, b).
Supposeg(x) changes sign, from negative to positive, exactly once, ∫ b
a
g(x)dG(x) =
0, and r ′(x) > 0. Then ∫ b
a
r(x)g(x)dG(x) > 0.
Proof: Suppose g(x0) = 0 and let r0 = r(x0). Then
∫ b
a
r(x)g(x)dG(x) =
∫ b
a
(r(x)− r0)g(x)dG(x) > 0,
since the integrand is always positive for x = x0.
Proposition 2. Suppose u(·) is twice differentiable, increasing, concave, and ex-
hibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Define uˆ(w, γ ) by (20), and let λˆ(w, γ )
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be the Arrow-Pratt risk coefficient for uˆ(w, γ ). Then λˆww ≥ λˆλˆw implies λˆγ > 0;
i.e., increasing the agent’s exposure to ζ increases the agent’s risk aversion with
respect to w.
Proof: Since λˆ = −Eζ uww/Eζ uw (using the notation of Lemma 1), we have
λˆγ (w, γ ) = −
Eζ
[
ζ(λˆ(w, γ )uww + uwww)
]
Eζ uw
. (21)
Now λ(w) = −uww(w)/uw(w) implies uwλw = −(λuww+uwww). Suppose λww ≥
λλw. Then
d(uwλw)
dw
= uwwλw + uwλww = uw [−λλw + λww] > 0.
Notice that ζ is increasing and since Eζ ζ = 0, it changes sign exactly once, going
from negative to positive. It follows from Lemma 2 that
Eζ [ζ(λuww + uwww)] = Eζ [ζuwλw] > 0. (22)
When γ = 0 we have λˆ(w, γ ) = λ(w), so (22) and (21) imply λˆγ (w, 0) > 0, so
λˆ(w, γ ) > λ(w) for some nonempty interval 0 ≤ γ < 3. Moreover, the same
reasoning implies that for any γ such that λˆ(w, γ ) ≥ λ(w), we have λˆγ (w, γ ) > 0.
It follows that λˆ(w, γ ) > λ(w) for all γ > 0 and λˆγ (w, γ ) > 0.
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